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User characteristics that inluence 
judgment of social engineering attacks in social 
networks
Samar Muslah Albladi*  and George R. S. Weir
Introduction
Although stronger security measures are increasingly developed, promoted and 
deployed, the number of security breaches is still increasing [1]. his may be because 
cybercriminals often target a weak and easy access point, the user. No security issue can 
arise unless there is a weakness that can be exploited by cybercriminals [2]. Security 
breaches are causing signiicant damage to organizations in diferent industries through 
decreasing customer trust [3] and stock returns [4]. According to a report published in 
2015, the estimated cost of the data breach that occurred in 2013 to Target, a retail com-
pany in the US, ranges between $11 million to $4.9 billion [5]. Furthermore, a recent 
study conducted by Ponemon Institute [1] states that cyber breaches among 419 organi-
zations cost an average of $3.62 million. Using advanced and sophisticated deception 
methods to manipulate the user in order to access sensitive information is the essence 
of social engineering (SE). Most communication media, such as email, telephone, and 
recently social networks, have been afected by social engineering threats (Additional 
ile 1).
Abstract 
Social engineering is a growing source of information security concern. Exploits appear 
to evolve, with increasing levels of sophistication, in order to target multiple victims. 
Despite increased concern with this risk, there has been little research activity focused 
upon social engineering in the potentially rich hunting ground of social networks. 
In this setting, factors that influence users’ proficiency in threat detection need to be 
understood if we are to build a profile of susceptible users, develop suitable advice 
and training programs, and generally help address this issue for those individuals 
most likely to become targets of social engineering in social networks. To this end, the 
present study proposes and validates a user-centric framework based on four perspec-
tives: socio-psychological, habitual, socio-emotional, and perceptual. Previous research 
tends to rely on selected aspects of these perspectives and has not combined them 
into a single model for a more cohesive understanding of user’s susceptibility.
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Social networks are one of today’s most popular communication media and attract 
millions of active users to share and express their thoughts, photos, and locations with 
others. his popularity has also attracted cybercriminals who ind social networks to 
be a rich setting for their illegal activities. For example, social networks may be used 
as the main channels for cyber-bulling activities [6]. hrough social networking sites 
(SNSs), social engineers can execute direct attacks, such as social networks phishing [7], 
and reverse social engineering [8], or indirect attacks, when the victims’ social network 
accounts are hijacked to collect information that facilitates subsequent attacks in other 
contexts. For example, determining employees’ personal information through track-
ing their online footprints in social networking sites [9], or by linking employees’ pro-
iles across multiple SN channels [10] which can facilitate successful social engineering 
attacks on their company.
Relying on social network providers to protect their users’ privacy and security from 
cybercriminals is a common attitude among users of such networks. hose users may 
tend to reveal their sensitive information online without being aware of potential exploi-
tation [11]. Social engineering attackers usually use deceptive strategies to convince their 
victims to accept the lure instead of exploiting technical means to reach their victims.
he risks to users persist, with a recent study revealing that only 25% of their partici-
pants have detected the phishing attacks [12]. hus, research aiming to comprehend 
human activities and practices that lead to potential abuses is vital to thwart the efec-
tiveness of any security threats [13]. Existing social engineering vulnerability studies 
have concentrated on variables that make human users powerless against social engi-
neering threats, such as personality traits [14], demographics [15], and online habits [7] 
separately, but have never attempted to analyse their impact together in the same struc-
ture in the context of social networks. he present study proposes and validates a user-
centric framework (UCF) with a view to building a coherent understanding of human 
susceptibility to social engineering-based attacks in the social network (SN) setting.
he present study is not the irst to investigate human vulnerabilities to social engi-
neering in social networks context but, afords novel theoretical contributions by (i) 
incorporating experts’ opinions in determining the most inluencing factors that impact 
upon users’ threat detection abilities and (ii) combining multifaceted factors and vari-
ous theories in one framework to understand human behavior when encounter online 
threats.
his paper is organized as follows. “Literature review” section briely reviews the rel-
evant literature. he method used to build the proposed framework is summarized in 
“User characteristics framework construction” section. Following this, the approach 
used to validate this framework and the methodology adopted in this work is described 
in “Validating the proposed UCF” section. In “Results and indings” section, the results 
of the analysis are discussed together with the indings. “A service scenario for using the 
proposed UCF” section provides a service scenario for using the proposed framework. 
Finally, “Conclusion” section draws conclusions from this work.
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Literature review
Social engineering in social networks
When investigating human behaviour toward online threats, it is important to focus on 
the interaction between the individual’s attributes, their current context, and the mes-
sage persuasion tactic [16]. According to a taxonomy proposed by Krombholz et al. [17], 
the three main entities that encapsulate social engineering attacks are operator, type, 
and channel. he operator of the attack can be either a human or malicious software.
he type of operator can also determine the chosen type of social engineering attack. 
One taxonomy [18] has classiied the type of attack to be technical-based, which includes 
phishing, scam, and malware, or human-based, such as impersonation, identity theft, 
and reverse social engineering. An example of a technical based attack in social net-
works is the cross-site scripting attack that recently become popular among criminals in 
SNSs [19]. In contrast, persuading the victim to contact the attacker by connecting with 
the victim’s friends through a reverse social engineering technique [8] is an example of a 
human-based attack in social networks.
Context plays a critical role in social engineering attacks because this determines the 
complexity of the attack, especially for the operator. It has been argued that in social 
networking sites, there are three main sources in the user’s proile that cybercriminals 
use to reach their victims, content, friendship connections, and privacy settings [20]. A 
network’s privacy and security settings are important measures to protect the user. Even 
with the limited functionality of current social network security and privacy preferences 
[21], if users adjust the network’s privacy setting and prevent non-friends from accessing 
their account, the attacker would not be able to use the account to gather the informa-
tion required to conduct indirect attacks.
he receiver of the attack is always responsible for evaluating and recognising the 
attack in order to prevent it from succeeding. he user’s ability to detect the attack is 
determined by a range of user characteristics. Figure 1 presents a general taxonomy of 
Fig. 1 General taxonomy of social engineering attacks in social networks
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social engineering in social networks which is developed from previous taxonomy stud-
ies. However, among the four major entities that formulate the social engineering attacks 
in social networks, the present study focuses only on receiver characteristics that make 
the end-user more vulnerable to social engineering attacks and will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section.
User vulnerabilities
User vulnerability to social engineering can be deined as the set of user attributes that 
incline that particular user (rather than other individuals) to be a victim of social engi-
neering attacks. Previous user vulnerability research can be divided into four groups 
depending on the focus of attributes that they investigated.
Behaviour‑related attributes
Prior literature on email environment victimisation [22–24] has explored the efect of 
social network habits on predicting behaviour toward email phishing. In the virtual net-
work setting, users tend to exhibit their trust by their degree of engagement in the net-
work [25]. he individual’s level of network engagement can be determined by a number 
of factors such as number of friendship connections [7], or time spent in the network 
[26]. High levels of social media usage have been found to make users more exposed to 
online threats in knowledge exchange networks [26].
A technical study [27] conducted on the Twitter platform found that proile and con-
tent related features are eicient predictors of malicious and honest users. Vishwanath 
[7] also examined how user habits in Facebook can predict the user’s vulnerability to 
social media phishing attacks, concluding that user’s social network habits such as fre-
quency of use, lack of control over usage behaviour, and maintaining online relationships 
can anticipate social engineering victimisation and that highly-active users are more sus-
ceptible to social engineers as cybercriminals consider them more valuable. For instance, 
highly-active users may ensure the accomplishment of the attack as the friendship 
connection between the victim and the attacker may lead to the victim’s friends being 
deceived by a reverse social engineering technique [8]. Conversely, users with fewer 
involvement components, such as limited number of connections and less regular use, 
are not the best targets for the attack in light of the fact that the lure message may not be 
seen at all, since the user does not utilize the SN much of the time.
Moreover, the behaviour related studies reported above do not clarify the reasons that 
relate the online user’s habits to the phishing victimisation. One possible explanation 
for this relationship is that the users’ online habits may afect their perceptions, on fac-
tors such as risk and trust, which in turn afect their susceptibility to social engineering-
based attacks.
Perceptual‑related attributes
Protection motivation theory has been taken as a theoretical foundation for many 
studies in the ield of information security (IS). One such is Workman et al. study [28] 
which suggested that perceived severity and perceived vulnerability to security threats 
are signiicant predictors of users’ security behaviour motivation. According to pro-
tection motivation theory in IS research [29], when a user encounters a threat, four 
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cognitive factors will be needed to assess the threat: perceived vulnerability (estimation 
of threat occurrence), perceived severity (to what extent the consequences will be cruel), 
response-eicacy (to what extent the protection behaviour will be eicient), and self-
eicacy (assessment of individual ability to adopt protective behaviour).
Perceiving the risk associated with engaging in online activities is considered a direct 
inluence of people suspicious of existing online threats [22]. Notably, some research 
found no correlation between perceived risk and users’ behaviour toward either email 
phishing [30], or social network victimisation [26]. his contradicts the view that the 
individual’s perceived severity of negative consequences predicts their detection or 
avoidance behaviour of online threats. Furthermore, some research has focused on other 
individual attributes such as self-eicacy [24, 30], security awareness [30, 31], and pri-
vacy awareness [7, 23], all of which play an important role in self-protection practices 
online. Yet, an investigation of the limitations of current SN privacy control systems sug-
gested constructing new user-focused privacy requirements that give SN users the abil-
ity to control and protect their contents [32].
Socio‑psychological‑related attributes
Personality traits impact on phishing victimisation has been noticed by social engineer-
ing researchers. However, this has only indicated that speciic traits may cause higher 
susceptibility rates and did not test whether speciic demographics, such as gender, con-
tribute to this relation.
Existing empirical studies have measured the relationship between the Big Five Per-
sonality Traits and email phishing victimisation [23, 33]. However, there are still some 
antithetical results as Halevi et al. [23] stated that neuroticism is the trait most corre-
lated to responding to a phishing email, while Alseadoon et al. [33] found that openness, 
extraversion, and agreeableness are the personality traits that increase the possibility of a 
user response to phishing emails.
Furthermore, gender, age, and educational background are the most contradictory 
variables in the existing literature of phishing research [34] and are repeatedly exam-
ined in relation to phishing victimisation. According to the potential victim’s age, some 
research results state that younger users are the most potential and vulnerable targets of 
deception. Yet, these results are di cult to generalise as the vast majority of such studies 
were reported on constrained samples, mainly university students [23, 33]. It was found 
recently that among many examined demographic features, computer usage experience, 
as well as gender, are the most signiicant predictors of user’s detection ability of web-
based phishing attacks [12]. Yet, in the context of victimisation in social networks, self-
conidence in computer skills might lead to risky behaviour as a positive relationship has 
been found between higher computer skills and user victimisation [26].
Culture has been given less attention in IS research in general and in social engineer-
ing victimisation research in particular. One report on email phishing [35] has stated 
that some cultural value might incline people to behave in a certain way such as being 
trustful, or generous. hose people will be more vulnerable to phishing victimisation as 
they may easily be exploited if emotionally persuaded by the attacker [35]. Flores et al. 
[36] investigated whether culture has an impact on email phishing resistance among 
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employees from diferent nations (USA, Sweden, and India). he study result proved the 
signiicant role of culture in the users’ behaviours and decision-making at times of risk.
Socio‑emotional‑related attributes
he attacker’s persuasion techniques are various and their impact on the users’ 
responses are diverse and related to the chosen inducement tactic, as revealed by Work-
man grounded theory investigation [37]. As a group of people can be persuaded by trust 
and friendly rapport, others can be inluenced by fear tactics.
Extracting emotional-based features from a social network platform has been found to 
derive information useful to distinguish between malicious and honest users [27]. Other 
existing research [38, 39] has focused on emotional triggers, such as fear and anxiety, 
that incline users to react to various types of social engineering attack. Trust is one of 
the emotional variables that has not been given enough attention in previous research. 
In reality, trust is a basic component of any online or oline individual’s communication 
and relationship enhancement. A further study [40] proposes that friendship connec-
tions reveal high accuracy as measures of trust among social network individuals. Trust 
in the virtual environment of social networks can be classiied into two types: trusting 
the medium and trusting the members [41]. he density of information sharing in a 
social network is related to the amount of trust their users have with regards to the net-
work providers and members [41]. Trust regularly prompts a lesser perception of risky 
behaviour, which eventually may raise the likelihood of succumbing to social engineer-
ing attacks.
User characteristics framework construction
Following the extensive literature review on the user characteristics that may inluence 
the user’s judgment of online attacks, several attributes have been chosen to develop a 
user-centric framework. To construct the framework based on existing studies and theo-
ries, the following is a summary of the steps that have been taken.
Selected attributes grouped under themes
In an attempt to build a focused and coherent framework, the selected attributes have 
been categorised and grouped under themes in regard to the attribute’s nature.
Removing and merging overlapping concepts
When the attributes have been grouped in themes, similar and overlapping terms were 
obvious which allowed for the merging of some terms in order to form a single attribute. 
For example, computer expertise, computer experience, and email experience are related 
factors and can be represented under the single term ‘computer knowledge’.
Framework construction
Based on the previous classiication process, the framework was constructed after con-
verting 51 terms into 14 factors. Figure 2 shows the proposed user-centric framework 
(UCF). Appendix A presents the deinition of each factor in details.
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Comparison of similar frameworks
Similarly-motivated and empirically tested frameworks in the literature, in email or 
social network environments, have been reviewed to indicate the similarity and difer-
ences between them (as presented in Table 1 where (√) indicates inclusion of the attrib-
ute in the considered model, see also [42]). From the comparison, it was clear that the 
socio-psychological factors have been given extensive attention by researchers in the 
ield. Research has considered limited perceptual and habitual variables in their models, 
while the socio-emotional perspective and its dimensions have never been investigated 
before in relation to their efect on social network victimisation. Yet, in an email envi-
ronment [33] and [30], have examined people’s disposition to trust others as a personal-
ity adjective and its impact on email phishing.
In social network models, some variables, such as personality traits, culture, and 
past experience with cyber-crime, have rarely been considered to inluence victimisa-
tion. Regarding past experience, Parrish Jr., Bailey, and Courtney’s model [43] has pro-
posed experience as a potential factor that impacts the user judgment. Yet, this model 
has still to be evaluated and, therefore, is not included in our comparison. Furthermore, 
in the perceptual perspective, the individual’s estimation of the severity and likelihood 
of threats and their privacy and security awareness might be considered insuiciently 
investigated in previous models. Two models have indirectly studied privacy awareness 
and its relation to phishing vulnerability. Vishwanath [7] model has investigated the indi-
vidual’s privacy concerns that indirectly refer to privacy awareness, and has found this 
Fig. 2 User-centric framework (UCF)
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to be not signiicant. Likewise, Halevi et al. [23] model investigated the privacy aware-
ness indirectly through examining the user’s adjustment of Facebook’s privacy settings 
as a pattern of the user-Facebook activity, which proved to be a signiicant predictor to 
phishing vulnerability.
he need for a multidimensional perspective has emerged after conducting this com-
parison. here are many signiicant attributes that should be considered when exam-
ining user vulnerability to social engineering victimisation. In contrast to the existing 
frameworks, the proposed framework afords a more extensive and robust user-centric 
model that provides a starting point for future studies to understand user susceptibility 
to social engineering in SNSs.
Validating the proposed UCF
he present study adopted expert reviews as a mixed method approach to validate the 
proposed framework with an objective to conirm or modify the proposed UCF. his 
approach is important as a means to evaluate the dimensions and attributes of the newly 
developed framework in order to get proper feedback and validate the proposed frame-
work in the study context. he study detailed here was composed of two major parts: 
quantitative and qualitative. In the quantitative part, participants were presented with 
the proposed framework, asked to read each factor’s description carefully and rate the 
importance of the framework’s factors in terms of their efects on users’ judgments of 
social engineering attacks in social networks. he qualitative part includes some open-
ended questions that aim to gather the experts’ opinions and recommendations to 
improve the proposed framework. Two rounds of experts’ review were conducted in 
the present study in order to increase the reliability of results by using the inter-rater 
reliability approach [45]. his approach aims to identify the degree to which the results 
obtained from both rounds of the evaluation are stable and yield similar results, even 
though diferent experts have participated in each round. he results of the two rounds 
have been compared in order to examine whether there are any diferences between the 
two groups in terms of the importance of the frameworks factors to identify users’ abil-
ity to detect online threats. Figure 3 describes the process that has been taken to validate 
the proposed framework.
Fig. 3 Framework validation method
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Instrument design
An online questionnaire has been designed which has three parts. he irst part asked 
about participants’ demographics such as their age, gender, and level of expertise. he 
second part includes the framework dimensions and factors. Each factor has a brief 
description to explain what it means in the study context. Respondents have been asked 
to rate the importance of each framework factor on a 5 point Likert-scale. In the third 
Part, participants were asked to express their opinions about the framework by answer-
ing three open questions. Completing this part was optional. he open questions asked 
the experts to indicate the following:
From your experience, are there any factors in the framework that should be com-
bined?
From your experience, is there any factor in the framework that should be split?
From your experience, do you think there are any other factors that should be included 
in the framework?
Sampling
To be included, participants required suicient knowledge and signiicant experience in 
the information security ield. Experts were selected with this in mind from universi-
ties’ and organisations’ websites. he selected experts were sent an email asking them 
to participate in the survey. In the two study rounds, 63 emails have been sent with 27 
responses received, from which 11 have completed the open-ended questions. Table 2 
presents the demographics of the experts who participated in the qualitative part of the 
study. he adequacy of using small sample in the expert review approach has been con-
irmed in a number of previous IS studies [45, 46]. However, in order to mitigate any 
residual limitation from sample size, the sample selected included both genders, a range 
of ages between 25 and 44 and also included diferent levels of education and expertise.
Table 2 Qualitative study Expert’s demographics
Expert number Age Gender Education Expertise (years)
Expert 1 35–44 Male Ph.D. Over 15
Expert 2 35–44 Male Ph.D. 11–15
Expert 3 35–44 Female Ph.D. Over 15
Expert 4 35–44 Female Ph.D. 11–15
Expert 5 35–44 Female Master 11–15
Expert 6 25–34 Male Master 6–10
Expert 7 35–44 Female Master 6–10
Expert 8 35–44 Female Master 6–10
Expert 9 25–34 Male Master 1–5
Expert 10 25–34 Male Bachelor 1–5
Expert 11 25–34 Male Bachelor 1–5
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Procedure
An invitation email was sent to the selected experts asking them to participate in the 
study. he study was conducted in two phases. In the irst phase, an email was sent to 
43 information security specialists who work either in academic or other organizational 
sectors. 30 responses were received of which 15 completed the survey. he second phase 
was conducted 1 month later. An email was sent to 20 information security experts, all 
of whom were academic lecturers in Saudi Universities, and 12 responses were received. 
he reason behind conducting the second phase of experts’ review with a diferent sam-
ple of experts is to increase the reliability of the framework’s validation and the results of 
the irst experts’ review.
Analysis methods
he collected quantitative data (Additional ile  1) was analysed using SPSS statisti-
cal software. Previous research provided evidence for the robustness of parametric 
statistics with Likert-scale data even with some sort of violation on sample size and 
normality [47, 48]. herefore, the present study used one sample t-test to analyse the 
result for the irst group and an independent t-test to compare the results of the two 
groups.
Results and indings
Agreement upon the framework’s factors
In order to measure the sample agreement level on the framework factors, one 
sample t-test was carried out. This test would determine the importance of each 
factor in order to decide whether to keep it or remove it from the framework. 
Table 3 describes the mean from the five-point Likert-scale and the corresponding 
attitude.
Table 3 Attitude of the scale mean
Mean Attitude Description
1.00–1.79 Not important The item must be excluded from the framework
1.80–2.59 Slightly important
2.60–3.39 Moderately important Item needs revision to be included in the framework (if the item mean is 
less than 3, exclude the item from the framework)
3.40–4.19 Important The inclusion of this item is essential for the framework
4.20–5.00 Very important
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Before starting the validity stage, the data went through several screening steps to be 
checked as follow:
Data screening approach
he data has been checked for any missing data. One participant response was removed 
from the test as the participant missed 5 sequence items in the rating question which 
implies that this particular participant had decided not to complete the questionnaire. 
Furthermore, Shapiro–Wilk test has been used to check the normality of the data. Data 
has been found as normally distributed (sig.  >  .05) except for the habitual dimension 
(sig. =  .038) in the irst round and socio-emotional (sig. =  .019) in the second round 
which considered slightly violated from normality.
According to checking careless responses, the “user’s height” item has been added as a 
bogus item to the socio-psychological item set in order to reveal inattentive responses. 
Results showed that all respondents in both phases were giving suicient attention and 
ranked the item as “Not important”, with means 1.7 and 1.5 respectively.
Validity of the test
In order to validate the questionnaire scale reliability, Cronbach’s alpha has been meas-
ured for both study phases. Cronbach’s alpha for all perspectives was above .5 except for 
the socio-emotional perspective. According to the socio-emotional perspective in the 
second phase, Cronbach’s alpha was only .399. herefore, trusting items should be sepa-
rated from the motivation item in order to increase the reliability to .855 as observed in 
the test. his implication is also supported by the indings from the expert qualitative 
study and this will be discussed more in the indings section.
One sample t‑test
After screening and checking the collected data, the data was ready for the statisti-
cal tests. he one sample t-test was conducted with the goal to determine the sample 
agreement level of each item and thereby determine whether to include or exclude this 
item from the framework. Items with mean less than 3 are considered not important 
and must be excluded from the framework, as described earlier in Table 3. his deci-
sion can be taken after establishing the test hypothesis: H0: the null hypothesis (μ = μ0); 
there is no signiicant diference between the sample mean and the population mean; 
which indicates that the mean of each framework factor is equal to 3. H1: the alternative 
hypothesis (μ ≠ μ0); there is a signiicant diference between the sample and population 
mean; which indicates that the factor mean is not equal to 3.
To test this hypothesis alpha (α = .05) has been chosen as Support H0 if the item’s sig. 
is greater than alpha (no diference in means). Support H1 if the item’s sig. is less than or 
equal alpha (there is a diference in means).
Table 4 lists the one sample t-test results. Generally, the t-test results show that all the 
framework’s selected factors are considered important in this round. In the following 
section, each theme will be analysed separately.
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Findings and discussion
Socio-psychological attributes It can be seen from Table 4 that the signiicance value in 
all the socio-psychological items is less than alpha (= .05). herefore, the null hypothesis 
will be rejected, except for the gender item. In this case, the alternative hypothesis will 
be rejected and the null hypothesis will be accepted. However, the statistic mean for this 
item is higher than the population mean (μ0 = 3) and has been ranked as moderately 
important in the scale which makes this item hard to exclude from the framework. Sur-
prisingly, the experts did not consider gender as a very important determinant, a result 
that opposes many previous studies [12, 23, 31]. One of which was Algarni et  al. [31] 
experimental study that revealed a strong correlation between gender and response to 
social engineering attacks in social network contexts. Moreover, it can be seen from Fig. 4 
that education has the highest rank among other considered factors. his result con-
licts with a previous study which argued that the level of education is not signiicantly 
related to phishing victimisation [12]. But most importantly, when comparing university 
students with people from outside higher education institutions [44], both behave in a 
similar way in social networks. Yet, students have been found to be less likely to fall victim 
to cyber-attacks.
Computer knowledge is considered one of the highest rated factors in the experts’ 
assessment (Fig. 4). Yet, among many studies [12, 23, 24, 26, 30] that have empirically 
tested the impact of the Internet and computer knowledge in preventing users from get-
ting phished, only two studies [12, 30] found this relation to be signiicant. his contra-
dictory result might imply that user internet or computer knowledge is a very general 
concept whose impact on safe or risky behaviour could be hard to measure. In the qual-
itative study, Expert 5 mentioned that as the targets of the attacks are social network 
users, there is no need to measure their computer knowledge and instead, measuring the 
social network literacy is more relevant. Another participant, Expert 6 had a similar view 
as he mentioned that computer knowledge is not important if internet security and pri-
vacy awareness are measured, as all these attributes are related to each other and could 
be merged in one construct. Furthermore, Expert 9 stated that nowadays, social network 
users generally have the basic knowledge of computer usage. But the problem lies only 
with their knowledge of computer security.
Table 4 One sample t-test (irst group)
Factor Sig. Mean Attitude Hypothesis Factor Sig. Mean Attitude Hypothesis
Per_T .002 4.14 Important Alternative Trust_M .002 4.07 Important Alternative
Age .003 4.14 Important Alternative Motivation .055 3.57 Important Alternative
Gender .671 3.14 Moderately 
important
Null Risk .003 4.00 Important Alternative
Education .000 4.57 Very impor-
tant
Alternative Self_efficacy .045 3.64 Important Alternative
Comp_K .000 4.50 Very impor-
tant
Alternative Severity .165 3.43 Important Null
Culture .000 4.14 Important Alternative Liklihood .045 3.64 Important Alternative
No_frinds .045 3.64 Important Alternative Past_exp .008 4.07 Important Alternative
Frq_use .045 3.64 Important Alternative Priv_aware .015 4.07 Important Alternative
Trust_P .009 3.93 Important Alternative Sec_aware .000 4.43 Very impor-
tant
Alternative
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Habitual attributes he experts’ evaluation revealed that habitual factors are on the 
importance side to include in the framework. his supports previous indings that pre-
sented the critical role of the involvement level of the user on the phishing vulnerability 
both in the email context [22–24], or in the social network context [7, 26].
Socio-emotional attributes Unlike the context of email, social network members play a 
vital role in users’ trust. Table 4 shows that trusting the social network members is the 
factor ranked highest by the experts as causing users to poorly judge social engineering-
based attacks in a social network context. Furthermore, people tend to rely on social 
network providers to protect them against privacy and security threats, which explains 
their trusting attitude online.
he socio-emotional factors, SN trust, and usage motivation were ranked as important 
by the experts, and this relected the gap in the literature, as these two factors have never 
been encountered in previous frameworks. Although Workman model [37], Alseadoon 
model [33], and Wright and Marett model [30] have studied the individual’s disposition 
to trust as a factor to afect the user vulnerability to email phishing, they did not reach 
the same conclusion. Workman and Alseadoon’s studies have found that individuals who 
are more trusting would be more vulnerable to social engineering than others. In con-
trast, Wright and Marett’s study has found the relationship between trust and deception 
success to be not signiicant. Yet, in this study, two types of trust have been proposed, 
trusting SN provider and trusting SN members, which are more speciic to the context 
of social networking. However, Expert 3 suggested combining these two types of trust in 
one construct. Expert 8 also suggested splitting the motivation factor into multiple sub-
factors as there are various types of motivations that persuade users to engage more in 
SN. hus, this study proposes trust as a multi-dimensional construct that includes pro-
vider trust and member trust. his also conirms the previous indings of the reliability 
tests of the second group that the Cronbach alpha will be raised from .399 to .855 if the 
motivation item is deleted and only the two types of trust remain.
Perceptual attributes he survey results revealed that the perceptual factors are gener-
ally very important factors to consider in relation to user susceptibility to social engi-
neering. Results shown in Fig. 4 indicate the importance of security awareness, which 
has been proven to be signiicant in previous empirical studies either in an email setting 
Fig. 4 The three highest rated factors
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[30], or a social network environment [31]. his importance has been emphasised by the 
answer of Expert 2 in the qualitative part of the study as he stated that some of the per-
ceptual perspective attributes, such as self-eicacy, security, and privacy awareness, are 
very critical and can represent the user’s defense ability.
Moreover, perceived severity of threat was given the lowest rank in the experts’ assess-
ments, with mean only 3.4 which opposes the indings that this factor is very important 
in determining the individual’s behaviour toward online risks [28, 49]. Both studies used 
self-administered questionnaires to measure the severity of threat which might be con-
sidered a common way to gauge the individual’s perceived threat. Another explanation 
for the low rank given to perceived severity of threat has been proposed by Expert 1 as 
he answered that severity of threat and the likelihood of threat can be considered as a 
multi-attribute that provide an assessment of the user’s risk perception. Likewise, Expert 
4 commented that user expectation of the threats occurrence and their perception of 
risks associated with using social network are similar and can be combined together. he 
rating results show very close means between the likelihood of threat and the perceived 
risk which support Expert 4’s comment.
Independent sample t‑test
An independent samples t-test was conducted to examine whether there is a diference 
between the two groups in the study sample. he grouping variables used in this test are 
nationality and gender. herefore, the means of the framework’s items have been compared 
between the multi-national experts’ group (irst expert review phase) and Saudi experts’ 
group (second expert review phase) to identify any impact of cultural diferences on the 
results, and then between male and female to identify the presence of gender diferences.
In order to conduct the independent samples test, two steps have been considered. 
First, testing the homogeneity of variance; using Levene’s test for equality of variances. 
he hypotheses for Levene’s test are: Support the null hypothesis, H0, if the Levene’s 
test (p-value > .05), the variances of the two groups are equal (equal variances assumed). 
Support the alternative hypothesis, H1, if the Levene’s test (p-value ≤ .05), the variances 
of the two groups are not equal (equal variances not assumed).
Second, testing means diferences; as can be seen from Table 5, the output of the t-test 
includes two rows: equal variance assumed and equal variance not assumed. he inde-
pendent samples t statistic is calculated diferently in these two rows. herefore, depend-
ing on the level of the variance from the irst step the appropriate result will be read from 
the table. To test the means diferences, alpha (α = .05) has been chosen as Support H0 
if the signiicance of the t-test is greater than alpha (no diference in means). Support H1 
if the signiicance of the t-test is less than or equal alpha (there is a diference in means).
Findings and discussion
Culture comparison It can be seen from Table 5 that the Levene’s test p-value for most 
of the items is greater than alpha (sig. > .05), which means that the null hypothesis is sup-
ported and the variances of the two groups are equal. However, one item that has rejected 
the null hypothesis is culture, therefore, the alternative hypothesis is supported for this 
item, as the variances of the two groups are not equal and indicate that the homogeneity 
of the variance has been violated.
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When comparing the means in the second part of the t-test, it was clear that most of 
the items supported the null hypothesis (sig. > .05) as there were no diferences in means 
between the two groups, except for one item which is education (.018).
For the education attribute, there was a diference in means between the two groups 
(sig. < .05). he diference of opinion here was on the importance level of the education 
factor, which causes the diference in means between the two groups. Yet, both groups 
have rated education as being on the importance side, to be included in the framework. 
Furthermore, there was an agreement among experts in both groups with regard to the 
low importance of gender diferences in the user’s poor judgment of social engineering 
based attacks in SNSs. Generally, all items in both groups were ranked on the impor-
tance side, which means that the framework’s items have been conirmed by both groups 
of experts.
Gender comparison Since the previous section has revealed that both groups have given 
similar responses regarding the framework’s items, this means that the data gathered 
from the two groups can now be combined and tested together in order to examine if the 
experts’ gender inluenced the framework’s factors’ validation. To this end, independent 
samples t-test has been conducted on two gender groups (male and female). Table 6 pre-
sents the independent samples test results.
Table 6 shows that the Levene’s test p-values for most of the items are greater than 
alpha (sig. >  .05) which means that the null hypothesis is supported and the variances 
of the two groups are equal, except for three items which have rejected the null hypoth-
esis and accepted the alternative hypothesis (perceived risk, self-eicacy, and perceived 
severity of threat).
When comparing the means in the second step, it was clear that four items rejected 
the null hypothesis (the number of friends, frequency of use, perceived risk, and per-
ceived severity of threat). For these four items, there was a diference in means between 
the two groups (male and female) as can be seen in Fig. 5.
According to the socio-psychological attributes, both male and female participants 
agree that gender is not a very important factor to predict social engineering victimiza-
tion. Also, Fig. 5 indicates that there were some opposing views among the two genders 
with regard to habitual items and their efect on the user’s vulnerability to social engi-
neering. Male experts agreed that the number of friends and the usage frequency of a 
social network are not very important factors that afect the users’ judgment of social 
engineering attacks in social network. However, female experts have the opposite opin-
ion, as they ranked these as very important factors. Additionally, female experts are 
agreed about the importance of perceived risk and perceived severity of threat while, in 
contrast, male experts believed that perceived risk and perceived severity of threat are 
not very important factors to consider. Once again, these disagreements were regarding 
the importance level of the items while both groups ranked all items as important and 
should be included in the framework.
Attributes that must be added to the framework
he irst and the second questions of the qualitative part of the study have been dis-
cussed earlier with the quantitative part. his section will discuss the third question 
Page 18 of 24Albladi and Weir  Hum. Cent. Comput. Inf. Sci.  (2018) 8:5 
T
a
b
le
 6
 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
sa
m
p
le
s 
t-
te
st
 (
g
e
n
d
e
r)
L
e
v
e
n
e
’s
 t
e
st
t‑
te
st
 f
o
r 
e
q
u
a
l‑
it
y
 o
f 
m
e
a
n
s
S
u
p
p
o
rt
e
d
 h
y
p
o
th
e
si
s
L
e
v
e
n
e
’s
 t
e
st
t‑
te
st
 f
o
r 
e
q
u
a
l‑
it
y
 o
f 
m
e
a
n
s
S
u
p
p
o
rt
e
d
 h
y
p
o
th
e
si
s
F
S
ig
.
t
S
ig
.
F
S
ig
.
t
S
ig
.
P
e
r_
T
Tr
u
st
_
M
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.0
0
2
.9
6
4
−
 .1
5
3
.8
8
0
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
1
.6
8
.2
0
8
−
 1
.8
0
.0
8
4
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 .1
5
8
.8
7
6
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 2
.2
4
.0
3
5
A
g
e
M
o
ti
va
ti
o
n
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.1
2
1
.7
3
1
.5
2
3
.6
0
6
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.3
4
1
.5
6
5
−
 1
.5
9
.1
2
6
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
.4
9
6
.6
2
8
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 1
.6
4
.1
1
8
G
e
n
d
e
r
R
is
k
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.2
6
9
.6
0
9
−
 .3
0
5
.7
6
3
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
7
.2
3
.0
1
3
−
 1
.6
7
.1
0
7
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 .3
0
5
.7
6
4
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 2
.0
7
.0
5
0
A
lt
e
rn
at
iv
e
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
Se
lf
_
e
ffi
c
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.1
2
6
.7
2
5
.5
3
7
.5
9
6
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
6
.5
2
.0
1
7
−
 1
.6
2
.1
1
8
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
.5
5
1
.5
8
8
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 1
.9
1
.0
6
8
N
u
ll
C
o
m
p
_
K
Se
ve
ri
ty
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.1
8
5
.6
7
1
.9
1
9
.3
6
7
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
7
.7
5
.0
1
0
−
 1
.7
6
.0
9
1
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
.9
0
7
.3
7
8
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 2
.0
3
.0
5
4
A
lt
e
rn
at
iv
e
C
u
lt
u
re
Li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.0
4
0
.8
4
3
−
 .1
5
3
.8
7
9
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.8
2
6
.3
7
2
−
 .6
6
9
.5
1
0
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 .1
4
9
.8
8
3
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 .7
1
1
.4
8
6
N
o
_
fr
in
d
P
as
t_
e
xp
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
.6
0
4
.4
4
5
−
 2
.2
7
.0
3
3
A
lt
e
rn
at
iv
e
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
1
.7
0
.2
0
4
.1
0
9
.9
1
4
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 2
.5
6
.0
1
8
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
.1
2
2
.9
0
4
Fr
q
_
u
se
P
ri
v_
aw
ar
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
3
.6
6
.0
6
8
−
 3
.3
6
.0
0
3
A
lt
e
rn
at
iv
e
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
1
.2
3
.2
7
8
−
 .7
1
4
.4
8
2
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 4
.1
9
.0
0
0
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 .7
9
5
.4
3
5
Tr
u
st
_
P
Se
c_
aw
ar
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
3
.7
7
.0
6
4
−
 1
.8
7
.0
7
4
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
as
su
m
e
d
1
.7
2
.2
0
2
−
 .5
7
1
.5
7
3
N
u
ll
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 2
.1
4
.0
4
3
 E
q
u
al
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
n
o
t 
as
su
m
e
d
−
 .6
7
1
.5
0
9
Page 19 of 24Albladi and Weir  Hum. Cent. Comput. Inf. Sci.  (2018) 8:5 
which asked the experts if they think there are other attributes that should be included 
in the framework. Expert 2 suggested adding more attributes regarding the users’ knowl-
edge of social networks, applications, and settings. In addition, Expert 7 suggested look-
ing at the uncertainty level of the user, which might be considered under the culture 
factor. Expert 10 has stated, “here are many factors that can be added here but might 
not explain the behaviour of all social media users. However, some young people are 
careless and they did not deal with the social media seriously they communicate with 
anybody either known or not with the goal to enjoy and pass time”. Expert 11 agreed 
with this point of view and said, “People use social media to entertain themselves and 
do not want to bother use them with high concentration and full attention, they usually 
click on any video or image without even reading the post”. he suggestions from Expert 
10 and Expert 11 can be categorized under the personality trait of the user and their 
motivation for using social media, factors that are already present in the framework.
Fig. 5 Gender comparison
Fig. 6 A service scenario for using UCF
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A service scenario for using the proposed UCF
his section introduces a potential service scenario that can enable extracting user’s 
vulnerabilities based on our proposed model. Figure  6 presents the six steps that can 
identify and protect against users’ vulnerabilities. Firstly, using the four proposed per-
spectives, the considered population’s ability to deal with cyber-attacks can be tested. 
In this step, users’ behaviour and perceptions can be collected either by monitoring or 
designing a questionnaire. After that, an analysis of the collected data is essential to esti-
mate the weakest points of the considered population and to determine which perspec-
tive is considered at risk. he vulnerable perspective can be regarded as the driver for 
training in the subsequent step. A purpose-focused training session will be designed 
speciically for vulnerable users, thereby reducing the cost against training sessions for 
all in the considered population. Furthermore, designing interventions that could serve 
as a back-up for the identiied weak points of vulnerable users would be useful. Finally, 
this process can be beneicial if conducted on a regular basis (e.g., annually). For exam-
ple, if the monitoring process revealed that the population’s security and privacy aware-
ness are limited, this indicates vulnerability to exploitation in the perceptual perspective 
of those users. herefore, designing a training program that focuses on increasing users’ 
perception of the risks arising from their work environment is appropriate. he training 
may present real case examples on how users can maintain their knowledge and abil-
ity to secure their private data. Additionally, algorithms can be developed based on the 
proposed characteristics, in order to automatically identify vulnerable individuals in the 
population in order to provide security interventions that protect them.
Conclusion
he proposed user-centric framework was the result of integrating previous research, 
after conducting a comprehensive study of existing human-centric frameworks and 
related theories. he expert evaluation has been designed to validate the framework’s 
attributes and the results of this validation relect the experts’ conirmation and accept-
ance of the framework’s components. Yet, some amendments have been made to the 
framework according to the experts’ recommendations. In the socio-psychological per-
spective, computer knowledge has been replaced by social network knowledge. Most 
social network users should already have basic computer knowledge but their knowl-
edge of social networking sites and applications is more critical to the study purpose. In 
the perceptual perspective, two dimensions are included which are risk perception and 
the user competence dimensions. he risk perception includes the severity of threat and 
the likelihood of threat while user competence includes self-eicacy, privacy awareness, 
security awareness, and past experience. In the socio-emotional perspective, two dimen-
sions are included which are the motivation dimension, and the trust dimension which 
includes the attributes of trusting SN members and trusting SN provider.
he study highlighted the riskiest factors that impact users’ vulnerabilities, particularly 
in social network settings. Yet, how these factors interact with each other and how we 
can mitigate their inluence is still unclear. Incorporating experts’ opinion on identifying 
the reasons behind the failure of cyber-attack resistance is a fundamental step toward 
understanding why people still succumb to cyber-attacks. Detecting the prime interven-
tions between people and the likelihood of victimisation is important for social network 
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providers in order to protect their users. For example, providing security and privacy 
tutorials that cover the four proposed perspectives would be helpful for the normal user. 
Classifying the users based on their habitual and socio-psychological attributes in order 
to identify vulnerable users is another area that network providers should consider.
he result is helpful for conducting more successful training approaches that incor-
porate the most important attributes from the four proposed perspectives as education 
elements to increase people awareness. As the identiied factors might be seen as user’s 
threats points, these factors can be targeted by enforcing behavioural security strategies 
to mitigate social engineering threats.
Organisations can use this framework to evaluate and understand employee perspec-
tives when using social networks in order to initiate more efective interventions. Several 
types of interventions can be generated based on the present indings. Education-based 
interventions can be proposed to enhance people awareness and skills to detect social 
networks threats. Also, special-features interventions could be designed to cover up the 
weak points of a speciic group of people. For example, if a particular company noticed a 
lack of privacy awareness among their employees, a tool could be designed to ofer more 
eicient privacy control that is in keeping with the company’s policy and needs.
he present study has several limitations that must be acknowledged. he experts’ 
review approach that has been used in this study may not be considered the best way to 
predict user vulnerability. At some stage, this requires experimental studies, which can 
give more empirical and accurate results. Also, the sample size is relatively small which 
is often the case in expert review studies as it is di cult to ind a large number of experts 
willing to participate in such a study. Yet, the purpose of the present study is not to gen-
eralize our proposed framework on the study area as it is the case with empirical stud-
ies but to shed light on important factors and dimensions that have not been previously 
addressed, especially in the context of social networks. Under this perspective, the chosen 
approach and the sample size used in the expert review is adequate to serve our purpose.
Another limitation is that the knowledge backgrounds of the participants are not 
diverse, as all of them specialise in the information security ield. It would be worth know-
ing what experts from diferent disciplines think about the proposed framework. Finally, 
while extensive steps have been taken to ensure the inclusion of all afecting factors in the 
framework, it is not feasible to guarantee that all possible inluences are included in this 
framework. Yet, this limitation has been minimised by the qualitative part of the study 
that includes open-ended questions. his prevented experts being limited to the frame-
work’s factors and allowed them to suggest more factors that they believed to be impor-
tant. herefore, using a mixed method approach in the expert review has eliminated the 
limitation of both the quantitative and the qualitative part of the study.
Future research will concentrate on empirically testing the framework factors and 
dimensions on the social engineering victimisation in the social network context. Also, 
the framework can be enhanced to suit diferent security issues related to cloud comput-
ing or Internet-of-hings, in order to understand the key factors afecting the individual’s 
threat detection ability. he proposed user-centric framework could help in determin-
ing the competence level of social networks users in detecting cyber-attacks and this 
could provide new technical solutions that rely upon monitoring of human activities. For 
example, enriching security alerts by integrating network intelligence and insights upon 
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human behaviour. Future research can go further by automatically classifying SN users 
based on the framework’s attributes that can be retrieved from the network in order to 
add an extra layer of security for those characterised as more vulnerable.
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Appendix A
Factor Deinition
Personality traits User behaviour can be patterned and categorised in five different traits which 
are: openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and neuroti-
cism
User demographics The present study considers the importance of each demographic attribute 
such as age, gender, education as an independent factor
Culture The user’s nationality
Perceived risk of social network To what extent the user is uncertain whether an online action is worthwhile 
or not
Experience with cybercrime Has the individual previously faced or fallen victim for any kind of social engi-
neering attacks such as identity theft, phishing, etc
Perceived severity of threat The individual’s perception of the severity of threats that might be occurred in 
social networks and the negative consequences of that threats
Perceived likelihood of threat The individual’s perception of the likelihood of threats and the possibility of 
falling victim to social engineering attacks in social networks
Privacy awareness Users’ attitude and actions in order to protect their personal information online
Security awareness Users’ attitude and actions that aim to protect themselves from online security 
threats
Self-efficacy The individual’s confidence in their ability to protect themselves against any 
undesirable online incidents
Level of involvement To what extent a user engages in social network activities
Trust in provider To what extent the individual trusts and relies on the social network’s service 
provider to protect their personal information
Trust in members To what extent the individual believes that other social network members are 
trustworthy and not harmful
Motivation to use It is defined as the motivation that causes the individual to engage more in 
social networks without conducting preventive measures
Additional ile
Additional ile 1. The dataset used in this study.
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